Monsters cannot be announced. One cannot say: 'here are our monsters', without immediately turning the monsters into pets. (Derrida, 1989; p. 80)

The world is full of monsters. We can ignore them—leave them alone (if they'll let us)—or we can turn them into pets. The ‘academic’ approach to the latter strategy generally involves taming rather than simply naming; we cannot abide unruly pets. Here are some of my monsters.

Road Kill

In 2007 it seems that there were 12,800 deaths resulting from ‘Road Traffic Incidents’ in Vietnam. Given that the population of Vietnam is around 85 million, this represents approximately 15 deaths per 100,000 of the population. In the same year in Great Britain, there were 2714 deaths in a population of about 58 million—less than 5 per 100,000. Vietnamese roads would seem to be a good deal more dangerous than those in Great Britain. But then in 2007 there were 13,985 ‘crashes’, whilst in Britain there were 182,115 ‘injury accidents’. Clearly, there are all sorts of questions that we might want to ask about the accuracy of these figures and all sorts of other figures that we might want to know; Britain has about twice the total length of (generally much wider) roads as does Vietnam, for example. Nevertheless, the difference in ratio of crashes/injury accidents to deaths—1.1 in Vietnam, 67.1 in Britain—is staggering; a death for every accident in Vietnam, only a little more than 1 in seventy in Britain. Now the situation in both countries is very complex, I’m sure, but an important clue in seeking an explanation for the difference might be the proportion of total road vehicles in each country that are motorcycles: about 3.7% of about 36 million in Great Britain; 95% of about 26 million in Vietnam. So, believing in and interpreting these figures, for the purposes of this paper, Britain would seem to have about 13 times the number of accidents that Vietnam has, but drivers in Britain would seem to benefit from the added protection afforded by modern automobiles over that of, well, the crash helmet (the wearing of which has been compulsory in Vietnam since the end of 2007 (Nguyen et al, 2008)). There are, however, other differences between the two environments.

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1 All figures for Vietnam are from Nguyen et al (2008).
On a recent visit to Vietnam (26th December 2008 – 2nd January 2009) I first encountered Vietnamese traffic in Ho Chi Minh City; see Figures 1 and 2. I can best describe the initial experience as scary. Hundreds of motorcycles clogged the road, cutting across each other's paths, cutting in front of cars, only centimetres away. There were traffic lights at the major junctions; motorcycles poured across the green route and piled up at the red lights like starters in the London marathon. Although speeds were very low, there seemed to be no way for a pedestrian to cross the road. Then I saw how the locals did it; essentially, they just walked across the road in-between the moving motorcycles where they had thinned out a bit. In Hoi An, a small, historic town near Da Nang, the traffic was certainly less dense, but the streams of motorcycles were, nevertheless, incessant. My tour guide—a young university student and freelance guide—walked along the streets, crossing junctions without apparently paying any attention to the traffic, which simply avoided her. On the main highway between Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, motorcycles were also much in evidence. Riders would often swerve or pull out in front of our car without, apparently, a glance in our direction. Our drivers would skilfully move out of the way or slow down or stop without colliding with anyone else in the scrum. In general, the rule appeared to be, bigger avoided smaller, though everyone took care around the juggernauts on the main highway. The drivers of the cars in which I travelled generally maintained at least the same speed as the rest of the traffic, rarely being overtaken, yet at no point did anyone exceed 50 km per hour; the speeds were very much lower on town roads. I saw the outcome of only a single accident: a motorcyclist had apparently hit or skidded whilst avoiding a very large pothole in torrential rain whilst riding the badly maintained national highway; they seemed to be OK.

Now, I want to refer to two categories that I've used in the past in taming this (already partially tamed) monster. The first distinguishes between strategies that tend to render explicit the principles of the practice underway, on the one hand, and strategies that do not—which is to say, that elaborate the practice as a tacit competence—on the other; I refer to these strategies as high and low discursive saturation, respectively—$DS^+$ and $DS^-$. The second category distinguishes between strongly and weakly institutionalised strategies—$I^+$ and $I^-$. Taking the product of these two binary, nominal (sic) variables gives rise to the relational space in Figure 3.
I want to focus, for the moment, on the 2x2 space opened up by the two categories that I have just introduced. I want to suggest that the strategies Vietnamese drivers deploy to keep them relatively free from road traffic incidents (though not from death, should they actually have an accident) are tacit, DS⁻ skills or tricks, depending upon the extent to which driving pedagogies institutionalise them. British drivers must also deploy such strategies, of course. However, British drivers must also deploy more principled, DS⁺ strategies in relation to explicit road management practice, which is in evidence to a far greater extent in Britain than in Vietnam. Let’s say, British drivers are able to rely on rules of procedure; Vietnamese drivers rely on each other, or, British drivers are able to rely on each other only to the extent that they can assume that everyone will obey the rules; Vietnamese drivers, it seems, do not obey rules in the same way, though, according to one of my drivers, they do generally keep their speed within the official limits since police officers have recently started jumping out from behind trees and pointing guns at them.

One question arising from this is: to what extent does the introduction of DS⁺ principles into a generally DS⁻ practice produce a shift of emphasis on the part of practitioners, in this case actually making the roads more dangerous? Will current developments in road traffic management and education in Vietnam (Bui, 2008) go in this direction? There is some evidence that moves to simplify traffic management systems—for example, removing safety barriers between pedestrian and road traffic areas (Webster, 2006); in a sense, a move in the opposite direction—can enhance road safety.

But, monsters, having been tamed, are recontextualised for purposes other than their own. We might think of the taming process in terms of transductions between modes (Jewitt et al., 2001), say: sensori-motor (road-user’s—including my own—direct experiences); iconic (Figures 1 and 2); symbolic (including Figure 3). For my purposes, however, this leads us too far down the road to the essentialising of textual modes (see Dowling, 2005 in press). To the extent that textual modes are meaningful, cultural activity generally involves many or all in one way or another, so the focus needs to be
on the activity rather than on a particular text; the latter, of necessity, wrenches the
text from the grasp of its cultural location. For example, in part, this paper constitutes
an attempt to institutionalise a particular way of making sense of the icons in Figures 1
and 2 and, perhaps certain sensori-motor experiences of its readers; it has, arguably,
rather less (though not zero) impact on the reading of Figure 4, even though it is,
according to its title, a related image; the shift towards abstraction (and we have to
know what that means) perhaps invites more free play.

Figure 4
Danang Motorcycling

The approach that I have taken is to consider cultural practices in terms of
strategies of DS and institutionalisation. Any particular practice—be it road use or
photography or anything else—will generally involve the deployment of a range of
strategies until we get down to a level of analysis at which we can constitute a single
strategy; arrival at such a level is, of course, also an analytic decision. Elsewhere
(Dowling, 2007, in press), for example, I have described the practices of research
education and mathematics education in terms of the strategic space of Figure 3. Have
you noticed that research methods textbooks, even ones as apparently practically
grounded as Strauss and Corbin (1998), enable you to label your analysis, but don’t
actually give you much (if any) help in actually doing it? Have you noticed that practical
mathematical activities don’t naturally lead to the particular symbolic generalisations that
the mathematicians want us to make; somewhere, somehow, someone has to make
these explicit, so that the student can look back and say, “Oh yes!” A tamed monster
can be paraded on all sorts of occasions.

Chaos in a mediaeval scriptorium

It seems that books made by monks in mediaeval scriptoria were a long way from
calligraphic perfection. In one ‘school for scribes’, Cohen-Mushlin (2008), for example,
described the way in which the master would scribe a few lines to act as a model for
his (sic) pupil, who would then take over the production of the book. Almost inevitably,
however, the pupil’s work was not up to scratch and the master would produce another
exemplar. This might be repeated many times. As the pupil progressed, they would
move to more challenging tasks, such as rubrication, again following the master’s
exemplars. Eventually, the pupil might himself become a master, but, in the meantime,
the book that he had been working on would be finished, complete with all of his inadequate work and, quite probably, the inadequate work of other pupils, together with the (presumably) adequate work of various masters. Parchment was too costly and the time involved in scribing too extended to allow pupils to practice to perfection before putting their marks on what would be the final (and first) version of a book. The result would be something of a hotchpotch in terms of calligraphy.

This is very different from the situation that obtains in respect of the apprenticeship of Japanese mingei folk potters (see Singleton, 1989). The apprentice, on initial entry to the pottery, is not allowed any involvement in the production process for quite an extended period of time, being limited to marginal activities, such as cleaning and making tea and, of course, watching. Eventually, the novice is allowed onto the wheel and told to make ichi man (10,000) sake cups. Naturally, the apprentice’s initial attempts are unworthy and so consigned to the bin to be recycled. Much later, some of his attempts will receive approval and be fired and sold in the shop—as seconds.

Both modes of pedagogy take place in the context of production, which is to say, the scriptorium and the potter’s workshop are the sites of the productive practices to which the novices are being apprenticed and their teachers are recognised practitioners of their respective crafts. However, there seems to be a fundamental difference. In the pottery, we have what looks like a traditional apprenticeship that, indeed, resembles Lave and Wenger’s (1991) ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ model. The apprentice is not allowed to be involved in actual production until their performance reaches a satisfactory standard; nothing will go out of the pottery unless it meets this standard. In the scriptorium, on the other hand, it is not possible to wait until the pupil reaches mastery. Nevertheless, pedagogy continues during the productive process. Emphasis, here, seems to be more on the production of a community of competent practitioners; like the ideal of a perfect product, this is also unachievable to the extent that there will be a continuous influx of new novices. The distinction, then, is between the prevalence of strategies that stress competence—the scriptorium—and the prevalence of those emphasising performance—the pottery.

Not all pedagogy takes place in the context of production. In the high school, for example, the nominal school subject is generally mediated by a curriculum and by a teacher, whose principal expertise is in teaching rather than in the discourse that they are relaying. The two dimensions of pedagogy that I have now introduced—what I shall call, ‘transmitter focus’ and ‘mediation’—generate the strategic space in Figure 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediation</th>
<th>Transmitter Focus</th>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unmediated</td>
<td>delegating</td>
<td>apprenticing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediated</td>
<td>teaching</td>
<td>instructing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5
Transmission Strategies
(From Dowling (2008)
Now, as with the space in Figure 3, the central categories—delegating, apprenticing, teaching, and instructing—do not totalise any pedagogic practice. Rather, the space serves to map strategies deployed by transmitters, which, overall, are likely to involve most if not all categories. For my present purposes, some explication of the terminology will suffice. The two modes that I have illustrated in the workshops are unmediated strategies. The novice potter is *apprenticed*, here, in the sense that the emphasis is on the perfection of performances, to the extent that only perfect can be sold with the master potter’s mark and only performances that are adjudged to be sufficiently close to this can be sold even as seconds. In the traditional apprenticeship, the passage to the next phase is marked by the production of the ‘masterpiece’; an affirmation of competence, to be sure, but emphasis, here, is also on the object—the performance. I have used the term, *delegation*, to signify the strategy that I have illustrated in the scriptorium, because this strategy seems to me also to characterise pedagogic delegation of responsibility, for example, in succession planning; for the transmitter to correct, rather than model, the acquirer’s performances may be to inhibit the development of competence, which, after all, may ultimately, take a different form from that of the transmitter.

The lower row of Figure 5 is constituted by mediated transmission strategies and perhaps the most familiar is mediation in the school classroom. Here, most commonly, performances are of no lasting value in respect of the activity of *teaching*, they are there purely as indicators of competence. The use of aegrotat or compensatory assessment, where the significance of the performance indicator is modified in the light of contingent circumstances is a prime example of the *teaching* strategy. *Instruction* strategies are particularly prevalent in sets of instructions for particular performances that are generally unlikely to be repeated very often: instructions for the assembly of furniture delivered unassembled; emergency procedures or instructions for the use of the TV or telephone system in hotel rooms; instructions for adjusting your servo-powered seat in business class aircraft cabins. Of interest, here, is the tendency, in some circumstances, for schooling to distribute teaching and instruction to the most and least competent respectively (see Dowling (1990, 1998) in respect of school mathematics). Insofar as schooling constitutes mediated pedagogy, which is to say, the transmission of a recontextualised discourse (cf Bernstein, 1990, Dowling, 1998, in press), this would tend to leave the least competent dependent on instruction in respect of a mythical practice. The tendency of schooling to recognise competence on the basis of social class renders this all the more poignant.

My use of the terms, transmitter and acquirer, will worry some readers who may reject a simple transmission-acquisition model of pedagogy. However, I reject this model as well. My approach understands pedagogic strategies and identities as being constituted contingently and in interaction (and its subsequent reflective recontextualisation); a view that owes its origins to interactive sociology (for example, Goffman, 1974, 1990; Strauss, 1997) and ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967). The categories that I am introducing are strategies, not states, plays, not results. Their

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3 See, for example, Bernstein, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Dowling, 1991, 1998; Sharp & Green, 1975; the work of the seventies in this exemplary list is dated, but should not be forgotten.
genealogies in specific contexts are not at issue here\footnote{But see Hunter (1994) for an interesting genealogy of the school.}, but, again, the schema in Figure 5 enables the mapping in strategic terms of educational contexts at different levels of analysis. Again, the categories of Figure 5 do not totalise any empirical setting—though the use of specific settings as illustrations may tend to make it appear so—nor does the schema itself totalise any setting, rather it provides an empirically derived, but logically exhaustive space for the announcement of strategies in and only in its own terms. These monsters have been fully tamed, but they may be tamed otherwise.

Taking schooling seriously in South Africa

In 1996 and 1997, Andrew Brown and I visited some high schools in the Western Cape area of South Africa.\footnote{These visits were made possible by an Overseas Development Agency funded link between Brown and myself and the universities of Cape Town and the Western Cape.} We have presented an account and analysis of these visits in Dowling and Brown (2007, also Dowling, in press). Here, I want to refer to a single finding. In two of the schools, students whom we interviewed were unanimous in their opinion that school knowledge had little or no value beyond the school. School success was important in giving access to higher education, which was, in turn, important in giving access to valued career opportunities. At a third school, however, we encountered a very different view, an astonishing view, perhaps, a monstrous view; here is Andrew Brown speaking with students at the school (English is not the students’ first language, possibly not their second or third):

\begin{verbatim}
AB  ... is matriculation important for the careers that you have chosen.
P1  Yes I think it is important because, to me I say the base of, if you got no matric you can’t do anything because each, each, anything that I’m going to do, the base of it would be a matric. So I say it is important to have a matric and then going to do [...] The base is matric and then take your career and then [...] 
...
AB  ... if I said that, OK, I’ve got some matriculation certificates here and I’ll just write one for each of you and give them out.
P2  [...] it wouldn’t count, you must have the base.
\end{verbatim}

School knowledge is here being constituted as vital in respect of the development of a competence that has value in respect of, well, all of the competences that are to follow and, in particular, to the most valued life opportunities relating to a ‘career’. The monstrosity of such earnestness is all the more apparent if I announce the nature of the schools. The first two were, respectively, an elite, primarily White school catering for the children of professionals and a dual medium (English and Afrikaans) school in a Coloured suburb, attended by children from a wide range of backgrounds, but including professionals. The third school was situated in an African informal settlement inhabited, primarily by casual labourers and school students, often living apart from their parents. The students speaking in the above extract were in a class for the 16-17 age group, but
only the girls in this class were of this age; these students were men of between 22 and 33 years old who had returned to school after saving money to support themselves and, in one case, a wife and three children.

Of course, all of the students have to acquire an appropriate level of competence in the practices that are their school subjects if they are to succeed, whether that success is understood as being based on certification or the knowledge itself. However, the strategies deployed differ between the first two and the third schools. The emphasis in the former settings is on what Bourdieu (1991) would refer to as symbolic capital, an objectified form, which, once acquired, may be 'exchanged' for other forms, in particular economic capital. In the third school, however, what seems to be important is a to-be-embodied habitus. This distinction in strategies is presented in the first of the central columns in Figure 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquirer Focus</th>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embodied</td>
<td>habitus</td>
<td>hub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectified</td>
<td>symbols</td>
<td>network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. Acquirer Strategies (From Dowling, in press)

The final column of Figure 6 distinguishes between strategies that focus not on the practice to be acquired, but on relations between participants. I do not have appropriate data to discuss these categories in relation to the schools, but I can draw on personal experience that I would imagine I share with all of my readers. So, I suggest that we all constitute certain relations as of value for themselves: close family members and friends, lovers, and so forth. The totality of this kind of relation places us at the hub of a radial sociogram; these relations are, in a sense, embodied as they materially impose on us. Less imposing relations are generally valued not in themselves, but rather for what they actually or potentially provide access to; in this sense, it is the objectified rather than embodied relations that are of value. The sociogram, here, is a network.

Figure 6 describes, but in its own way, strategies that relate to Bourdieu's (1991) cultural and social capital that may be deployed by acquirers. As with the other spaces introduced in this paper, I would expect individual acquirers and groups of acquirer to deploy more than one and potentially all of these strategies; students from the first two schools mentioned above must clearly be concerned with the development of habitus, even though they may consider the value of this embodied practice to be short-lived. Students from the third school explicitly mention 'matriculation', which is the symbolic

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6 I have always had a problem with Bourdieu's metaphor of capital exchange; after all, it is only economic capital that actually circulates (see Dowling, in press).

7 I am clearly stretching Bourdieu's (and Mauss's, 1979) use of this term, here and I will 'misread' more of his sociology below. This, however, is intended to be a productive misreading (see Bloom, 1973; Dowling, in press).
form of the practice. Similarly, I have certainly relied on members of my hub (parents, partner, friends) to gain access to other relations and network relations have occasionally developed into embodied ones. The schema does not box its monsters, rather it provides part of a language to talk about their dynamics; this is the nature of this particular form of taming.

**A conversation stopper**

Some years ago I found myself in a hotel bar in Mombassa. A group of us—holiday friends—were sitting round a table telling stories of previous vacations; exchanging narratives. All went well for a while—we all knew what game we were playing—until I presented an analysis of the situation (I can’t recall the nature of this analysis; it may have had something to do with our use of gesture). The group fell completely silent. This was quite embarrassing for a few moments. Then a brave soul came forward with another, quite ordinary, holiday story and all was well again. Of course, it’s clear what had happened: I had introduced another discourse that was competing with the one that we had previously shared; I had tried to turn an alliance of similars—we all knew what game we were playing—into an alliance of dissimilars. Further, the manner in which I had introduced my analysis had been rather didactic. I was presenting what I refer to as a *pedagogic text*: it was clear, I think, that I was seeking to maintain control over the principles of interpretation of the setting. The other contributions had been *exchange* mode: each narrative was offered for the amusement of the rest, to interpret as they saw fit and that often involved attaching another narrative to a metonym or two. Interaction in exchange mode does not entail any move towards closure; interaction in pedagogic mode does. This little tale has provided the basis for another strategic space, which is presented in Figure 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Target of Discursive Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>equilibration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
<td>hegemony</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7

Modes of Interactive Social Action

My intervention in the hotel bar conversation had involved a change of strategy from *exchange of narratives* to *hegemony*. The latter is the kind of strategy that we might expect to dominate where there is an attempt at transmission, in whichever of Figure 5’s categories. Acquirer strategies may attempt to reverse the hegemonic relation, of course.

On our way back from our visits the three South African schools mentioned above, Andrew and I would discuss what we had seen and heard in preliminary attempts to move towards an analysis. Again, we were playing the same game—this was an alliance of similars—but now there was an attempt at closure; this was *equilibration*.

The final category from Figure 7 is *pastiche*. This is a strategy that seeks to establish an alliance of dissimilars—as in the case of hegemony—but does not more
towards closure. I want to suggest that this is how I conceive of the relationship between the theoretical and empirical fields in research (see Dowling, in press; Dowling & Brown, in press). The process of research develops theoretical field discourse in dialogue with the empirical. It recontextualises the empirical field, but must always leave this field open for further and alternative dialogue. The subjects of other practices that may be the objects of research may themselves recontextualise theoretical discourse, but this is for the elaboration of the former and not the latter practice. The same kind of relationship obtains between Bourdieu’s work and my own in respect of Figure 6 or between poets in Bloom’s (1973) idea of ‘misprision’—a knowing misreading—or between school mathematics and the domestic and other practices that it mathematises (Dowling, 1998, in press). Naturally, just what counts as a discourse is itself the product of analysis; the question is, are the dominant strategies that are deployed most appropriately understood as serving to establish a sameness—equilibration/exchange of narratives—or a difference—hegemony/pastiche. The taming of monsters produces pets, but what happens to the monsters? Derrida, I think, underestimated them: taming, as construed here, is an exchange and not a pedagogic activity.

**Monsters on the rampage**

So, what is the point of taming monsters if they remain on the rampage and may even (occasionally) eat the pets that the taming has engendered? Well, let’s see. The categories that have been introduced in Figures 3, 5, 6 and 7 are part of a, now quite well-developed, organisational language, Social Activity Method (SAM) that currently comprises more than 200 specialised terms; more of this language along with its general approach, constructive description, is presented in Dowling (in press) and, indeed, Figure 3 already introduces rather more of the language than is referred to in this short paper. This schema enables the description of a practice in terms of the distribution and concentration of strategies that tend to strength of its institutionalisation and that tend to elaborate it is an explicitly principled way or that oppose one or both of these. This approach stands in contrast to other work in the sociology of knowledge that may have a tendency to totalise its object and here I am thinking particularly of the kind of analysis produced by Mary Douglas (1996) or by Basil Bernstein (1999) and others inspired by Bernstein’s structuralism. In this kind of approach, physics, say, is a vertical discourse exhibiting a hierarchical knowledge structure, and so forth. Whilst I may use a similar kind of generalisation of physics to illustrate a strategy—discourse, perhaps—having generated the schema, I am then in a position to look back in more detail at physics as an empirical setting in order better to reveal its complexity: is the practice of physics the same kind of thing in the laboratory, in journals, in the apprenticing (or delegating or teaching or instructing) of students, and so forth, and are any of these only one kind of thing (in terms of the prevalent strategies? The result is the production of something new—part of an organisational language—that may allow physics to see itself in a new light.

The schema in Figure 5 enables the description of a pedagogic setting as it would be established by a would-be transmitter of the practice—a practice that can be mapped by Figure 3. The dimension, mediation, refers to the extent to which the transmission is attempted in the context of the elaboration of the target practice, which is to say, in production, rather than in reproduction; school teachers are, in general, not attempting
the transmission of teaching skills, but are relaying something else. The other dimension in this schema distinguishes strategies that emphasise competence from those that stress performance. Many pedagogic settings may involve all four of the strategies in Figure 5. Consider, for example, sports coaching, which takes place both in mediated (focusing on specific micro-skills, say) and unmediated (player-coach as, simultaneously, player and coach) forms and will, in all likelihood, be concerned with both competence (the side has to work to play another day) and performance (but it would be better if we won on this day).

Figure 6 looks from the opposite direction and maps the potential interests of the would-be acquirer in terms of a distinction between cultural (practice) and social (relations) ‘capital’ and between embodiment and objectification. I have described this schema as arising out of a pastiche strategy with Bourdieu and also, as with the whole of SAM, with the empirical. The objectification/embodiment dimension—the terms themselves borrowed from Bourdieu (1977)—might also be seen to resonate with theories of motivation, for example, Leont’ev’s (1978) activity theory, Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of human needs, and the widely used distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (see, for example, Bénabou & Tirole, 2003). There are differences between my acquirer focus schema and each of these approaches to motivation. In particular, these theories propose essential hierarchies; my schema does not. Indeed, SAM avoids essentialising altogether, firstly, by constituting schemas of strategies that may be deployed in the formation, maintenance and destabilising of alliances and oppositions and allowing the success or otherwise of such strategies to remain contingent, but describable in terms of an agonistic field of strategies.

Secondly, SAM recognises itself for what it is, a theory that is necessarily other than that which it might take as its empirical origin or object. This brings me back to the schema presented in Figure 7. As I have pointed out, this and the other schemas originate in pastiche dialogue with the empirical; the empirical must be engaged, but must also be held at bay, otherwise the dialogue becomes a monologue. Within SAM, a particular schema may also develop in equilibration, which describes conceptual and terminological progress. Although there are synergies and even explicit connections between many of the schemas, there is no attempt to establish total closure of the system, so that, as this paper perhaps illustrates, they can also stand in relationship to each other as an exchange of narratives—petits récits rather than grand narratives (Lyotard, 1984). Indeed, too much coherence in the theory must also eliminate the theoretical-empirical dialogue by shifting into a hegemonic mode that would necrotise the latter. I suspect that this is the fate of all theories that do not insist on pastiche, that leave themselves unable to learn, opting instead for the greed of Midas (Dowling, 2005).

But what do the monsters make of all of this? This clearly cannot be spoken about here! We may hope that they will see their domesticated cousins in our menagerie and engage in another dialogue, but as Derrida might have said, had he not been installed in the academy:

Pets cannot be announced. One cannot say: ‘here are our pets’, without immediately turning the pets into monsters.
References


